Current Circuit Splits
The following pages contain brief summaries, drafted by the
members of the Seton Hall Circuit Review, of circuit splits identified by
a federal court of appeals opinion between October 31, 2007 and March
31, 2008. This collection is organized by civil and criminal matters, then
by subject matter.
Each summary briefly describes a current circuit split. It is intended
to give only the briefest synopsis of the circuit split, not a comprehensive
analysis. This compilation makes no claim to be exhaustive, but will
hopefully serve the reader well as a reference starting point.
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CIVIL MATTERS
IMMIGRATION
Board of Immigration Appeals – A Crime of Moral Turpitude:
Hyder v. Keisler, 506 F.3d 388 (5th Cir. 2007)
The 5th Circuit adopted the Board of Immigration Appeals’
(“BIA”) definition of moral turpitude which includes “an act which is per
se morally reprehensible and intrinsically wrong. . . .” Id. at 391. The
court noted that the defendant was convicted of misusing a social
security number and “almost all other courts have agreed that ‘deceiving
the government involves moral turpitude.’” Id. at 392. The 5th Circuit
disagreed with the 9th Circuit to hold that a person who misuses a social
security number should not be exempted from Crime of Moral Turpitude
status. Id. The 5th Circuit noted that the 9th Circuit heavily relied on
Congress’s committee reports, which exempted individuals “who use a
false social security number to engage in otherwise lawful conduct . . .
[and] should not be considered to have exhibited moral turpitude.” Id.
The 5th Circuit reasoned that the 9th Circuit expanded a narrow
exemption beyond Congress’s intent by extending the exemption from
moral turpitude status meant for lawful permanent residents to a class of
aliens whose acts were not necessarily exempt from moral turpitude
status. Id. at 393.
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
FICA – Definition of Taxable Wages: Univ. of Pittsburgh v.
United States, 507 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2007)
The 3rd Circuit addressed whether early retirement payments made
by the University of Pittsburgh to tenured faculty constitutes taxable
wages under the Federal Insurance Contribution Act (“FICA”), 26
U.S.C. § 3121–28. Id. at 166. The 3rd Circuit held that “the
relinquishment of tenure rights . . . does not alter the Plan payments’
character as compensation for services, and therefore as wages.” Id. at
171. In doing so, the court agreed with the analysis of the 6th Circuit,
noting that the “weight of authority holds that compensation paid to an
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employee for services to her employer constitutes wages under FICA
regardless of whether it is prospective (for lost earning potential), or
retrospective (as a reward for past service).” Id. This conclusion parted
with the 8th Circuit’s view that such early retirement payments
represented the “relinquishment of [the faculty’s] . . . constitutionallyprotected tenure rights rather than as remuneration for services to [the
University].” Id. at 170.
Education Law – Individuals with Disabilities Education Act:
Blanchard v. Morton School District, 509 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2007)
The 9th Circuit addressed whether 42 U.S.C. § 1983 created a cause
of action for monetary damages under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (“IDEA”) for lost wages and suffering when a parent
pursued IDEA relief on behalf of a child. Id. at 936. The court noted that
42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not “create any right under federal law.” Id. The
court also recognized that Congress amended the statute to include 20
U.S.C. § 1415(1) in response to the Supreme Court holding that the
IDEA was the exclusive means of remedying infringements on the rights
it guaranteed, and that the provision generally provides judicial relief for
“violations of any right ‘relating to the identification, evaluation, or
educational placement of [a] child.’” Id. at 938.
The 9th Circuit confronted a circuit split when interpreting whether
the amendment of section 1415 meant that Congress “intended the IDEA
rights to be enforceable under section 1983.” Id. The court noted that the
1st, 3rd, 4th, and 10th Circuits have held that Congress did not intend
such right to be enforceable under section 1983. Id. Conversely, the court
acknowledged that the 2nd and 7th Circuits found Congress intended the
right, and the 8th Circuit issued decisions reflecting both views. Id.
The 9th Circuit adopted the reasoning of the 3rd Circuit to hold that
because the IDEA provides a comprehensive judicial remedy scheme
whereby a parent can obtain relief for violations of rights incurred in the
pursuit of securing rights for disabled children, therefore Congress did
not intend section 1983 to provide an independent remedy to IDEA
violations. Id. Consequently, the 9th Circuit affirmed the decision of the
district court and concluded that the IDEA’s enforcement scheme did not
contemplate damages for lost wages and emotional distress obtained in
the pursuit of obtaining benefits for a disabled child. Id.
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FDCPA – Lawyer Communications: Evory v. RJM
Acquisitions Funding L.L.C., 505 F.3d 769 (7th Cir. 2007)
In this case, the 7th Circuit contemplated several issues split among
the circuit courts of appeals regarding the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act. The 7th Circuit first explained that “any written notice sent to the
lawyer must contain the information that would be required by the Act if
the notice were sent to the consumer directly.” Id. at 773. After resolving
the threshold issue, the court examined the circuit split on this issue of
“[w]hether communications to lawyers are subject to sections 1692d
through 1692f, which forbid harassing, deceptive, and unfair practices in
debt collection.” Id. at 772.
The 7th Circuit, siding with the 9th and 2nd Circuit Courts,
concluded that “a representation by a debt collector that would be
unlikely to deceive a competent lawyer, even if he is not a specialist in
consumer debt law, should not be actionable,” since a non-specialist
attorney could inform herself in order to represent her consumer clients
effectively. Id. at 775. However, the court carved out an exception by
holding that a false claim of fact that would be undiscoverable by a
lawyer without extensive investigation “would be actionable whether
made to the consumer directly, or indirectly through his lawyer.” Id.
The 7th Circuit further addressed the issue of “[w]hether the
determination that a representation is or is not false, deceptive, or
misleading under section 1692 is always to be treated as a matter of law.”
Id. at 772. Here, the court followed its own circuit precedent, concluding
that a claim of deception can be rejected on the pleadings even though
issues of deception tend to be treated as ones of fact. Id. at 776–77.
Citing a prior 7th Circuit case, the court explained that, “‘undoubtedly,
there will be occasions when a district court will be required to hold that
no reasonable person, however unsophisticated, could construe the
wording of the communication in a manner that will violate the statutory
provision.’” Id. at 777.
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CRIMINAL MATTERS
SENTENCING
Sentencing Guidelines – Recidivist Provision: United States v.
Pacheco-Diaz, 506 F.3d 545 (7th Cir. 2007)
In this case, the 7th Circuit considered the applicability of the
recidivist provision of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) in determining a defendant’s
sentence increase. Id. at 547. Noting the district court’s findings that a
conviction for marijuana possession should be treated as a federal felony
under the recidivist provision, the court also considered the actions of
several different circuits while deliberating the issue. Id. Declining to
follow the 9th Circuit’s position disregarding section 844’s penalties for
repeat offenders, the court instead applied the 2nd, 5th, and 6th Circuits’
approaches to find that section 844(a)’s recidivist provisions must be
applied “in determining whether a defendant’s prior state misdemeanor
conviction should be considered an aggravated penalty.” Id. at 549.
Because the court considered the other circuit holdings similar to the 7th
Circuit’s holding in United States v. Perkins, which evaluated the crime
of conviction, the 7th Circuit upheld the district court’s eight-level
sentencing increase. Id. at 549–50.
Sentencing Guidelines – Enhancements for Prior Convictions:
United States v. Lopez-Salas, 513 F.3d 174 (5th Cir. 2008)
The 5th Circuit agreed with the 6th, 9th, and 10th Circuits
regarding the use of a prior conviction of drug trafficking under state
law, to enhance the sentence of a defendant tried for violation of federal
law. Id. at 180. The defendant was convicted of drug trafficking under a
North Carolina statute which equated trafficking solely with the amount
of drugs in his possession. Id. at 177. The court, following the
Sentencing Guidelines, had previously held that “a drug trafficking
enhancement could not be supported by a conviction for transporting a
controlled substance unless the predicate statute included as an element
an intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense.” Id. 178.
In doing so, the court rejected the 11th Circuit’s conclusion “that a
state statute that presumes an intent to distribute creates a drug
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trafficking offense, as defined in section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)” of the
Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 179. The 5th Circuit instead adopted the
reasoning of the 10th Circuit, which stated “[f]irst, the absence of the
phrase ‘that has an element’ from the definition of a drug trafficking
offense is not significant enough to depart from the ordinary standard of
review . . . Second, incongruous results do not justify a departure from
the ordinary standard of review . . . [and although] [a]nomalies occur
when the evidence a court reviews is intentionally limited . . . the
Guidelines cannot be rewrit[ten] . . . simply because they might . . .
produce an anomalous result.’” Id. at 180–81.
Post Booker – Supervised Release: United States v. Bolds, 511
F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2007)
The 6th Circuit addressed the standard governing the post-Booker
review of sentences imposed upon the revocation of supervised release.
Id. at 573. The court recognized that that two standards of review exist:
Booker’s “unreasonableness” standard and the “plainly unreasonable”
standard in sections 3742(a)(4) and 3742(b)(4). Id. at 575. The court
recognized that the 4th and 7th Circuits apply a “plainly unreasonable”
standard of review while the 2nd, 3rd, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th Circuits
apply the “unreasonableness” standard. Id. The court then found that in
Booker, “the Supreme Court . . . was simply directing appellate courts to
apply the same reasonableness standard that they use to review
supervised release revocation sentences to their review of all sentences.”
Id. at 575. Consequently, the 6th Circuit held that post-Booker,
supervised release revocation sentences would be reviewed “in the same
way that we review all other sentences.” Id.
Bureau of Prisons – Placement in Community Correction
Centers: Muniz v. Sabol, 517 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2008)
The 1st Circuit created a circuit split in holding that “the Bureau of
Prisons (“BOP”) may, through rulemaking, deny placement in a
community corrections center (“CCC”) to all prisoners during the first
ninety percent of their sentences.” Id. at 31. The court found that the
BOP may make rules of general applicability, which “must conform to
the strictures of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 555.” Id.
The court remarked that the BOP, in addition to considering certain
factors mandated by Congress in making a determination, must also
leave room in the rules for consideration of other factors. Id. at 32.
The 1st Circuit remarked that its analysis differed from the other
circuits in two respects. Id. at 31. First, it noted that its analysis of the
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statute “reveals that the decision whether to transfer an inmate is not
constrained by the factors Congress lists, although the decision where to
transfer an inmate might be.” Id. at 31–32. Second, the court found that,
“even in initial assignment decisions, the question whether a CCC is
appropriate is only a part of the overall decision with which the BOP is
charged by statute.” Id.
Supervised Release – Tolling: United States v. Goins, 516 F.3d
416 (6th Cir. 2008)
The 6th Circuit decided a question of first impression, and
consequently created a circuit split as to “whether pretrial detention with
respect to an indictment that later yields a conviction tolls the running of
a period of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3624. Id. at 417. The
court noted that the 9th Circuit, the only other circuit to address this
exact issue, concluded that “pretrial detention [does] not trigger a tolling
of the period of supervised release. Id. at 419.
The 6th Circuit observed that the 9th Circuit distinguished between
“imprisonment” and “detention,” interpreting the former term to “refer to
a penalty or sentence” while the latter term was “used to describe a
mechanism to insure a defendant’s appearance and the safety of the
community.” Id. However, the 6th Circuit was not persuaded by the 9th
Circuit’s reasoning that “the phrase ‘in connection with a conviction’
means that a conviction must occur before any confinement can count as
imprisonment.” Id. The court stated that if Congress only wished
“imprisonment” to refer to a “confinement that is the result of a penalty
or sentence, then the phrase ‘in connection with a conviction’ becomes
entirely superfluous.” Id. at 421. Accordingly, the court declined to adopt
the 9th Circuit’s distinction between “imprisonment” and “detention”
and instead concluded that “‘imprison’ includes not only confinements as
a result of a conviction, but any time the state detains the individual.” Id.
The court then examined 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), which “creates a
connection between pretrial detention and a later conviction.” Id. at 422.
The court weighed two factors heavily in its analysis: the connection
between pretrial confinements and subsequent convictions, and the fact
that Congress did not intend “imprisoned” to “exclude pretrial detention
from the scope of section 3624(e).” Id. Accordingly, the court held that
“when a defendant is held for thirty days or longer in pretrial detention,
and he is later convicted for the offense for which he was held, and his
pretrial detention is credited as time served toward his sentence, then the
pretrial detention is ‘in connection with’ a conviction and tolls the period
of supervised release under section 3624.” Id. at 417.
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EVIDENCE
Balancing Test – Prior Convictions: United States v. Kelly, 510
F.3d 433 (4th Cir. 2007)
The 4th Circuit analyzed the circuit split between the 7th and 9th
Circuits regarding the application of the balancing test under Federal
Rule of Evidence 403 when deciding whether evidence of prior offenses
was admissible under Rule 414. Id. at 436–37. The court found that, even
if a prior conviction for child molestation qualifies for admission under
Rule 414, evidence of that conviction may nonetheless “be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice” to the defendant. Id. at 437.
The court concluded that the application of the Rule 403 balancing
test to prior offenses admissible under Rule 414 required the district
court to “consider a number of factors, including: (i) the similarity
between the previous offense and the charged crime; (ii) the temporal
proximity between the two crimes; (iii) the frequency of the prior acts;
(iv) the presence or absence of any intervening acts; and (v) the
reliability of the evidence of the past offense.” Id. at 437.
The 4th Circuit then noted the split among the circuit courts as to
whether a district court must address these or other specific factors to
make findings. Id. The court acknowledged that the 9th Circuit required
other specific factors to be considered while the 7th Circuit used a more
flexible approach that did not dictate a specific analysis. Id. The 4th
Circuit adopted the 7th Circuit’s approach, stating that a district court has
“‘wide discretion’ in admitting or excluding evidence under Rule 403.”
Id. The court noted that this standard better reflected the fact that “a
district court is much closer than a court of appeals to the ‘pulse of a
trial.’” Id.

